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CASENOTES
clause of the Constitution required the Maryland court to give effect to
a New York statute 0 said to be penal in nature. In that case, however,
the plaintiff sought to enforce a judgment based upon a foreign statute.
The purpose of the proceedings in the instant case was to procure a
judgment, the attempted basis for recovery being a foreign statute."
Even considering the distinction between enforcing and procuring
judgments, the question of whether foreign judgments under penal statutes
are entitled to full faith and credit is itself still an open one.18
It is apparent, considering the great weight of authority supporting
the decision of the Tennessee court, that the federal court reached an
erroneous decision. That the court realized its inadvertence is evident,
for subsequent to the decision of the Tennessee court in the instant case,
the federal court granted a rehearing and reversed itself.' 9 Oddly enough
the Huntington case, upon which the court's original opinion was based,
contained dictum which virtually compelled the rcversal.
Jerry Mosca
CONFLICT OF LAWS-WAIVER OF VENUE-
STATE NON-RESIDENT VEHICLE STATUTE
An Illinois corporation brought suit in a federal district court of
Kentucky against an Indiana resident for damages arising from an automobile
accident occurring in the State of Kentucky. W\Vith jurisdiction in federal
court based on diversity of citizenship, service of process upon defendant
was made in accordance with the Kentucky Non-Resident Motorvist
Statute.' Defendant challenged venue as being improperly laid in a district
not the residence of either party.2 A motion to dismiss on this ground
was overruled and the jury trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district
court.8  Held, on appeal, reversed. Defendant did not waive his federal
venue privilege by virtue of the state non-resident motorist statute.
Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R., 74 Sup. Ct. 83 (1953).
16. See note 6 supra.
17. See notes 1 and 2 supra.
18. Compare Fauntleroy v. Lurn, 210 U.S. 230 (1908), With Milwaukee County
v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
19. Doggrell v. Southern Box Co., 208 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1953).
20. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 683 (1892). "The test is not by what
name the statute is called by the Legislature or the courts of the state in which it
was passed, but whether it appears, to the tribunal which is called upon to enforce it,
to be . . . , a punishment of an offense against the public, or a grant of a civil right
to a private person." (Italics supplied.)
1. Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 188.020-030 (1953).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (Supp. 1950): "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is
founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be
brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside."
3. Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R., 201 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1953).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Jurisdiction is the right which a court has to hear and determine a
cause. 4 Formerly, states were powerless to enforce in personam judgments
against non-residents who were parties to litigation arising from acts
accruing within the state unless process could be served upon them while
within the state.5 Because of the increased ease of interstate travel made
possible by the advent of the automobile, there arose the problem of
attaining personal jurisdiction over non-resident motorists who became
involved in causes of action ensuing from their use of the state's highways.
In an effort to remedy this situation, New Jersey in 1906 enacted legislation
making it a misdemeanor for a non-resident motorist to fail to appoint the
Secretary of State as his agent to receive service of process.0  Following
the Supreme Court's approval7 in 1926 of a Massachusetts statute Which
provided that one who operates his automobile on the state's highways
automatically makes the Secretary of State his agent for the service of
process in any civil action arising out of such operation,s all states and
the District of Columbia have enacted similar legislation., Commonly
referred to as a non-resident vehicle act the above universally adopted
statute is basically a legislative device incorporated by a state to secure
personal jurisdiction over non-resident motorists.' 0  Service of process
under this statute confers personal jurisdiction in federal courts as well."
The non-resident vehicle act being primarily for the protection of
resident citizens12 a problem of venue is raised when neither party to a
cause of action resides within the state. Venue, as distinguished from
jurisdiction, relates only to the place of trial.13 A state cannot by legislation
modify or repeal a Congressional statute on the venue of federal courts. 4
However, being essentially a personal privilege intended for the convenience
of the litigating parties,' venue may be waived by "failure to assert it
seasonably, by formal submission in a cause, or by submission through
conduct.' 8  It is clear that unless by some act the defendant waives this
privilege, he is not properly before the court and is entitled to have the
suit dismissed or transferred to the proper district.' Of the courts which
4. See, e.g., Herrington v. Thompson, 61 F. Supp. 903, 904 (W.D. Mo. 1945).
5. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
6. For the Supreme Court's decision upholding the constitutionality of this statute,
see Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
7. Hess v. Powloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1926).
8. MAss. GEN. LAws c. 431 § 2 (1923).
9. For a complete listing of these statutes, see Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp.
832 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
10. See Blunda v. Craig, 74 F. Supp. 9, 10 (E.D. Mo. 1947).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (7); Blunda v. Craig, 74 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. Mo. 1947).
12. See e.g., Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R., 74 Sup. Ct. 83, 84 (1953); Knoop
v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832, 849 (ND. Iowa 1947).
13. See Riley v. Union Pac. R.R., 177 F.2d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1949).
14. Murphree v. Mississippi Pub. Corp., 326 U.S. 438 (1945).
15. See Lee v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 260 U.S. 653, 655 (1922).
16. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (Supp. 1950: "The district court of a district in which
is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be
CASENOTES
hold that non-resident motorists waive their right of objecting to venue
by virtue of the non-resident vehicle act, the vast majority s maintain that
the statute presents a situation analogous to that of the rule pertaining to
foreign corporations as announced in Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp.10 There the defendant, a Delaware corporation, when sued by a
non-resident of New York in a federal district court of New York, was
held to have waived its federal venue privilege by designating one of its
agents to receive service of process within the State of New York, The
federal district courts with but one exception have found the above analogy
to be applicable.20  Of the three cases which to date have been appealed
from the district courts to the circuit courts of appeal, 21 the sixth circuit,
in the instant case, was alone in holding that venue was waived.
The Supreme Court, in rejecting the analogy, reasoned that in the
Neirbo case waiver was based upon the express appointment of a resident
agent by the corporation as a prerequisite to doing business in the state,
whereas the non-resident motorist is held to impliedly waive merely by
the act of driving his car upon a state's highways. The motive behind
the granting of jurisdiction upon the basis of this statute is not consent,
but rather one of a social nature, i.e., desire to protect the state's citizens.
It seems obvious that our present venue statute erroneously assumes
that either the residence of the plaintiff or the defendant is the most
convenient place of trial. What is more natural or efficient than holding
a trial in the district where the cause of action accrues? Although the
field is in need of statutory revision,22 the holding of waiver, however
commendable from a practical viewpoint, cannot be justified upon this
crutch of fictional consent. The court here rightly refused to allow such
construction of so substantial a privilege.
William M. Hicks
in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could
have been brought."
18. For several recent cases using theory expressed by the Neirbo case, see Falter
v. Southwest Wheel Co., 109 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1953); Archarnbeau v. Emerson,
108 F. Supp. 28 (W.D. Mich. 1952); Jacobson v. Schuman, 105 F. Supp. 483
(D. Vt. 1952); Burnett v. Swenson, 95 F. Supp. 524 (W.D. Okla. 1951); Urso v.
Scales, 90 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
19. 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
20. E.g., Falter v. Southwest Wheel Co., 109 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1953);
Archambcau v. Emerson, 108 F. Supp. 28 (W.D. Mich. 1952); Jacobson v. Schuman,
105 F. Supp. 483 (D. Vt. 1952). Contra: Waters v. Plyborn, 93 F. Supp. 651 (E.D.
Tenn. 1950).
21. McCoy v. Siler, 205 F.2d 498 (3rd Cir. 1953); Olberding v. Illinois Central
R.R., 201 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1953); Martin v. Fishbach Trucking Co., 183 F.2d
53 (1st Cir. 1950).
22. See Jacobson v, Schuman, 105 F. Supp. 483, 485 (D. Vt. 1952).
